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The "Other" Federalist Papers: A Preliminary Sketch

The wise CONSTITUTION let's truly revere,
It points out the course for our EMPIRE to steer,
For oceans of bliss do they hoist the broad sail,
And peace is the current, and plenty the gale.

Our Freedom we've won, and the prize let's maintain,
Our hearts are all right—
Unite, Boys, Unite,
And our EMPIRE in glory shall ever remain.

The Grand Constitution: Or,
The Palladium of Columbia. A New Federal Song
—New Hampshire Recorder, October 23, 1787

To an even greater extent than the Anti-Federalists, the "other" Federalist writings stand in the shadow cast by the towering Federalist papers. The neglect they have suffered is not altogether undeserved. Taken as a whole, they tend to be rather shallow and routine. That can of course be said of most wide samples of political writing, but it is striking how much of the Federalist effort was directed to mere explication of the Constitution or to criticizing the opposition. Neither of these will concern us much here; but it is worth reporting that nearly half of the one hundred or so essays and pamphlets that form the basis of the present review are mainly criticisms of specific Anti-Federalist writings. It is hardly too much to say that among the "front line" debaters, the Anti-Federalists criticized the Constitution and the Federalists criticized the Anti-Federalists.

There is nothing in the Federalist writings comparable to the range and depth of The Federalist; nor are there the intriguing glimpses of an alternative American polity that emerge from the writings of

This chapter originally appeared in the Political Science Reviewer, vol. 6, Fall 1976. It is reprinted with permission.
the Anti-Federalists. Yet these "other" Federalist writings carried the main burden of the public defense of the proposed Constitution in 1787 and 1788; many of them are quite substantial; several of them were vastly more influential than The Federalist. Considering the writings of men such as James Wilson, John Dickinson, Tench Coxe, Roger Sherman, Oliver Ellsworth, Noah and Pelatiah Webster, Alexander Hanson, John Jay, James Iredell, and the many still-anonymous Federalist writers enables us to fill in our picture of the debate over the Constitution, to see more fully the diversity of Federalist views, and to identify some major themes or issues. What follows is based on a wide though not exhaustive survey of Federalist essays, pamphlets, and published speeches appearing in 1787 and 1788, with the main emphasis on the more penetrating writers and the more fundamental issues. It is meant to be suggestive rather than definitive.

It may be helpful to begin with a sketch of a typical Federalist essay, assuming that it was not merely attacking one of the Anti-Federalists. Our author would be likely to begin with an account of the precarious state of the American Union, emphasizing the economic stagnation, loss of credit, and dangers to commerce and safety caused by American weakness. Looking inward, he would probably refer to Shays' Rebellion and warn of the likelihood of increased domestic turmoil unless the governing capacity of the Union is strengthened. He would show the defects of the government under the Articles of Confederation, a government incapable of enforcing its resolves. He would describe in fulsome terms the Constitutional Convention under the leadership of the venerable Franklin and the virtuous Washington. All America agrees that the government of the Union requires additional powers; and the new general government

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1. See Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist, 7 volumes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981), the introduction to which should be read together with the present essay.

2. A list of the main Federalist writings on which this account is based is provided at the end of this essay. Footnote references will be to author (or pseudonym) and number in that list. Where appropriate, page references will be given to reprints in Paul Leicester Ford, Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States (Brooklyn, 1888); Paul Leicester Ford, Essays on the Constitution of the United States (Brooklyn, 1892); or John Bach McMaster and Frederick Stone, Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution (Philadelphia, 1888). These will be cited FP, FE, and M/S respectively. The state ratifying conventions are not considered here except for one or two speeches that were widely circulated in the press.
will possess only the powers specifically granted to it, which are no more than are required to deal with national concerns.

The much criticized powers of sword and purse, to which our author would give considerable attention, are indispensable to any government worthy of the name and are as well guarded as possible. All power can of course be abused, but the solution is to be found not in withholding necessary power but in a well-constructed government. Contrary to a common Anti-Federal claim, the states will not be destroyed by the new Constitution; they remain the organs of government for most domestic matters and they are vital to the operation of the general government itself. The new government, deriving from the pure source of all political authority, the people, will secure all of the advantages of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, while avoiding their disadvantages.

Our author would show at length why the representatives of the people will continue true to their trust; and he would explain the rational apportionment of power among the parts of the general government, together with the carefully devised scheme of checks and balances, all designed to reinforce governmental responsibility and secure wise government. He would deny, again probably at some length, that a bill of rights is necessary, contending that a good Constitution, such as the one proposed, is the proper "bill of rights" for a free people.

In conclusion he would return to the theme of Union and strongly urge that the alternative facing Americans is either acceptance of the new Constitution or the destruction of the Union. To insist on amendments prior to ratification or to call for a second convention is equivalent to rejecting the Constitution altogether. There is no likelihood that future deliberation would display anything like the spirit of patriotism and mutual concession achieved in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. Having successfully defended their liberties against one of the foremost powers of the world, having freely established governments designed to secure those liberties, having through a convention of their wisest leaders devised and improved their Union, the American people now have it in their power to conclude a political founding unique in the annals of human history. They can give an example to mankind of an excellent constitution adopted by open deliberation and free choice.

**Union**

The precarious state of the American Union is the first article in the Federalist defense of the Constitution. Relaxing after their great
public act of independence, Americans allowed selfish, partial interests to emerge, threatening the objects for which the Revolution had been fought. During the war, John Jay wrote, Americans worshipped their Union as the pagans worshipped their tutelar deities. "That union was the child of wisdom—heaven blessed it, and it wrought out our political salvation."3 During those times, "a sense of the common danger united every heroic, every patriotic soul in the great cause of liberty." Selfishness itself was stilled.4 So prevalent was this view that Americans made the "amiable mistake" of thinking that they were unlike other men and could do without coercive government. The ineffective Articles of Confederation were the result. "It was an honest and solemn covenant among our infant States, and virtue and common danger supplied its defects."5 When the danger disappeared, however, "a sense of security loosened the bands of union." "The spirit of private gain expelled the spirit of public good, and men became more intent on the means of enriching and aggrandizing themselves, than of enriching and aggrandizing their country."6 Americans need to resolve anew to "cling to Union as the political Rock of our Salvation,"7 and they need to face the fact that their Union requires a real government.

The Anti-Federalists admitted the inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation, but they thought that the new Constitution would sacrifice the states to a great national government. Responding to this claim that the Constitution was a " consolidation" rather than a strengthened federal government, the Federalists made two main arguments. First, they showed that the states were indispensable participants in the new general government itself. State qualifications for electors were to be the qualifications for the electors of the House of Representatives; states were to choose the members of the Senate and were to be parties in the choosing of the president. In these and other ways, the Federalists repeatedly contended, the states would be so involved in the actual constitution of the general government that it could not exist without them.

The second and more fundamental defense, however, was that, despite the increase in the powers of the general government, the new Constitution leaves with the states the whole responsibility of internal government except for those few areas that concern the

4. A Federalist (#40), M/S, p. 165.
Union as a whole. The standard argument here is one that is very familiar to Americans today. It describes the American system as dividing the powers of government between the general government, which concerns itself with matters that affect the Union as a whole, and the state governments, which concern themselves with those matters purely domestic. According to Pelatiah Webster, "the Constitution does not suffer the federal powers to controul in the least, or so much as to interfere in the internal policy, jurisdiction, or municipal rights of any particular State: except where great and manifest national purposes and interests make that controul necessary."8 Nor did the problem of drawing a line between state and federal jurisdictions seem so difficult: "the objects of federal government will be so obvious that there will be no great danger of any interference."9

These arguments did not satisfy the Anti-Federalists, and with good reason. State participation in filling the offices of the general government would mean little if the state were not secured an independent and significant sphere of power. And even granting the (doubtful) proposition that a clear line could now be drawn between the general concerns of the Union and the particular concerns of the states, the principle of distinction clearly implies a radical and, over time, almost complete subordination of the states. Some Federalists were happy to draw precisely that conclusion and only feared that federal supremacy would not occur soon or decisively enough. But most were at least equivocal, and it is that equivocation that we must examine.

One side of the Federalist view had been displayed by James Wilson in his speech of June 8, 1787, in the Constitutional Convention, when he said, "Among the first sentiments expressed in the first Congress, one was that Virginia is no more. That Massachusetts is no [more], that Pennsylvania is no more, etc. We are now one nation of brethren. We must bury all local interests and distinctions." This language continued for some time, Wilson said; but "no sooner were the States Governments formed than their jealousy and ambition began to display themselves. Each endeavored to cut a slice from the common loaf, to add to its own morsel, till at length the confederation became frittered down to the impotent condition in which it now stands."10 Wilson here suggests that the Union is prior

8. P. Webster (#104), FP, p. 128; see P. Webster (#103), MS, p. 99; N. Webster (#102), FP 46.
9. A Citizen of New Haven (#26), FE, p. 239; for detailed discussion see A Freeman (#43) and A Native of Virginia (#99).
to the states in principle and even historically; the state governments, he says, were formed after the first Congress. "Indulge no narrow prejudices to the disadvantage of your brethren of the other states," another Federalist wrote, following this same line of thought; "consider the people of all the thirteen states, as a band of brethren, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, inhabiting one undivided country, and designed by heaven to be one people." 11

In an interesting Federalist speech from Maryland, intended to be delivered to the ratifying convention but only published in July 1788, the historical and legal priority of the Union is asserted quite explicitly. Responding to the tyrannical impositions of the king and Parliament, this Federalist explained, the colonists united and appointed the first of the continental congresses which resisted British encroachments, determined upon separation, and prosecuted the war of independence. The state governments were instituted only later. "It is to be remembered, that congress existed before the [state] legislatures, and that it exercised all the powers, which are conferred by these articles [of confederation], and perhaps greater." 12

The priority of the Union to the states, which was later to be so eloquently and profoundly argued by Lincoln, may, I think, be said to be the "true" or "best" Federalist position. Yet what is surprising is that the Federalists did not make the Marylander's argument more often; usually they conceded the historical and legal priority of the states. Indeed in the same speech of June 8 in which he urged the primacy of Union James Wilson made another argument which denied it. "Federal liberty," he said, "is to States, what civil liberty, is to private individuals. And States are not more unwilling to purchase it, by the necessary concession of their political sovereignty, than the savage is to purchase Civil liberty by the surrender of the personal sovereignty, which he enjoys in a State of nature." 13 This "federal liberty" view was prominent in Wilson's defense of the Constitution in Pennsylvania, and it was very widespread among

11. Ramsay (#101), FP, p. 379; see Federalist 2.
12. Anonymous Speech to Have Been Delivered ... (#14). "Upon what basis does our Independence rest, so far as respects the recognition of Foreign Powers? Upon the basis of the UNION. In what capacity did France first acknowledge our Independence? In the capacity of UNITED STATES. In what capacity did Britain accede to it, and relinquish her pretensions? In the capacity of UNITED STATES.—In what character have we formed Treaties with other Nations? In the character of UNITED STATES.—Are we, in short, known in any other Independent character to any Nation on the face of the Globe?" Philo-Publius (#73).
Federalist writers. Wilson explained to his fellow Pennsylvanians that as civil liberty is that portion of natural liberty resigned by men to government, so federal liberty consists in the aggregate of the civil liberty which is surrendered by each state to the national government; "and the same principles that operate in the establishment of a single society, with respect to the rights reserved or resigned by the individuals that compose it, will justly apply in the case of a confederation of distinct and independent States."\(^{14}\) The federal and the state governments are not (as was often said) coordinate sovereignties, another Federalist insisted: "The general government is federal, or an union of sovereignties, for special purposes. The state governments are social, or an association of individuals, for all the purposes of society and government."\(^{15}\) Many Federalists claimed that a bill of rights was unnecessary under the new Constitution because the federal government was an association of states, not of individuals.

There are two implications of the federal liberty/civil liberty analogy that are problematical from the Federalist viewpoint. First, it seems to demand that the states in a federal system have equal votes, as individuals do in civil society, regardless of their different strength and wealth. William Paterson had made this point in the Constitutional Convention: "there was no more reason that a great individual State contributing much, should have more votes than a small one contributing little, than that a rich individual citizen should have more votes than an indigent one."\(^{16}\) In the convention Wilson had opposed an equal representation of the states and insisted rather on representation according to population, but he never gave Paterson a satisfactory reply. Some Federalists were more consistent and defended the equal representation of the states in the Senate as not merely a compromise (as Wilson regarded it) but a principled recognition of the "federal" character of the American Union.

A second and more fundamental implication of the "federal liberty" view is that the states are the crucial parties to, and presumably therefore ultimately the judges of, the general government. With independence from the crown, most of the Federalists seemed to think, the colonies also became independent of one another (as Luther Martin, later a prominent Anti-Federalist, had urged so forcefully in the Philadelphia convention). The states then determined on and were of course the parties of a new union.

\(^{14}\) Wilson, Speech of November 24, 1787 (#105), M/S, p. 227; see also Ramsay (#101), FP, p. 373.

\(^{15}\) A Pennsylvanian (#68), February 27, 1788.

As one thoughtful Pennsylvanian put it, since the center of the Union had been the crown, "the act of independence dissolved the political ties that had formerly existed among the states. . . ." However, the former colonies did not wish to continue "distinct bodies of people." "The remains of our ancient governments kept us in the form of thirteen political bodies, and from a variety of just and prudent considerations, we determined to enter into an indissoluble and perpetual union." The expression "We the people of the United States" means "We the People of the Several States," to whom reference was necessary because the new Constitution implied changes in the various state constitutions. Had the framers meant to refer to the American people at large, they would have said, "We the People of America," which is the term "constantly used in speaking of us as a nation." "Had the foederal convention meant to exclude the idea of 'union,' that is, of several and separate sovereignties joining in a confederacy, they would have said, we, the people of America; the union necessarily involves the idea of component states, which complete consolidations exclude. But the severality of the states is frequently recognized in the most distinct manner in the course of the constitution." 17 "The Constitution now before the public," a Federalist from New Hampshire wrote, "is not a compact between individuals, but between several sovereign and independent political societies already formed and organized." 18 A view of this kind is the basis for the rather typical description of the Constitution by Roger Sherman: "The Powers vested in the federal government are clearly defined, so that each state still retain its sovereignty in what concerns its own internal government, and a right to exercise every power of a sovereign state not particularly delegated to the government of the United States." 19 But does not this view of the Constitution as a compact among states lead straight to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and beyond? Is the authentic legacy of the Federalists expressed not by Abraham Lincoln but by John C. Calhoun?

It must be acknowledged of course that no view of the American Union that is true to history and the play of principle in the American founding can avoid ambiguity. Moreover, the Federalists had the usual motive of the political debater to take as much as he can of his opponent's ground. Nevertheless, it is striking how widely the

17. A Freeman (#43), January 23, 1788.
Federalists adopted the view of the Union as a coming together of sovereign states. Yet that is not the end of the matter, for it still somehow misses the way most of the Federalists really understood the American Union. Can their widespread acknowledgment of the origin of the Union in state sovereignty be reconciled with their deeper view of the Union as the basic, defining political association of this American nation?

At least a hint of such a reconciliation may be found in the Federalist essays of John Dickinson, writing as Fabius. One of the Old Republicans, Dickinson pressed the need for “humility and benevolence” to take the place of “pride and overweening selfishness” if successful free government was to be established. He presents a standard account of the origins of civil society, in which each individual gives up some share of his rights in order to secure the rest. In a confederation a similar principle operates; but Dickinson emphasizes that men are the materials of confederation as well as of simple government; the purpose of a confederation is to promote the happiness of individuals. “Herein there is a progression, not a contradiction. As man, he becomes a citizen; as a citizen, he becomes a federalist. The generation of one, is not the destruction of the other. He carries into society his naked rights: These thereby improved, he carries still forward into confederation.”20

Dickinson’s argument was not widely imitated, the way Wilson’s “federal liberty” idea was, but it nevertheless conveys, I think, a good deal of the spirit of the Federalist view of Union. The movement from man to citizen to federalist is a moral progression. Civil society is entered into to secure private rights; this requires a moderation of the pride and overweening selfishness of man in his natural state, which Dickinson sees as not only a means to but as a benefit of civil society. The same kind of observation applies to the next stage. “Federalist” here means a member of a wider association concerned with a wider and thereby somehow higher public good. Thus a Boston Federalist complained that the American people had become “desstitute of FEDERAL FEATURES and HABITS—the several State Constitutions are local, partial, and selfish. . . .” The new Constitution, on the other hand, is well designed “to form us to a national spirit,

20. Dickinson (#92), FP, p. 177. The ordinary use of the word “federalist” had at this time an ambiguity that should be noted. It referred to the principle of “federalism” (or “confederalism”), but it also referred to the agencies of the federation. When a man said he was “federal” in disposition, he meant he was inclined to strengthen and support the general government. This was the usage that entitled the Federalists to their name.
and to diffuse those generous federal sentiments, without which we never can be a happy and flourishing people."\textsuperscript{21}

There are repeated references by the Federalists to American nationality as something intrinsically worth preserving and superior to the claims of statehood. The line of thought here is that as civil society not only secures the rights of the natural man but improves him, so the government of the Union does not merely secure the states (admitting them to be the parties) but improves or perfects them. And Dickinson makes clear, what many Federalists do not, that even in a confederation the true parties are men. States may be the formal parties—and in this sense the narrower view of American Union may be correct—but an association of states is justified ultimately not in terms of "state" interest but as a broader or higher association of human beings. The new Constitution will "diffuse a national spirit, and inspire every man with sentiments of dignity, when he reflects that he is not merely the individual of a State, but a CITIZEN OF AMERICA."\textsuperscript{22} This view of the American Union explains both the Federalists' claim that the significance of the states will be increased, not destroyed, by a stronger Union and their very widespread association of the states with narrow selfishness and the Union with a morally more elevated benevolence and public spirit. Thus in appealing to the "mothers, wives, daughters and sisters of America" to use their influence in behalf of the Constitution, a Boston Federalist said "your hearts are naturally federal, prone to friendship, pity, love and generosity."\textsuperscript{23}

It is not inconsistent with this view that most of the Federalists described the specific objects of Union in terms of fairly narrow calculations of self interest. There are a few exceptions, as when the writer just quoted defends the Constitution as providing the civil order that is necessary "for the promotion of piety and every moral virtue."\textsuperscript{24} In the main, however, the objects of Union are described in terms like those of Roger Sherman: "The great end of the federal government is to protect the several states in their enjoyment of those rights ["the civil and domestic rights of the people"], against foreign invasion, and to preserve peace and a beneficial intercourse among themselves, and to regulate and protect our commerce with foreign

\textsuperscript{21} A Federalist (#39).
\textsuperscript{22} Convention (#30); see Philodemos (#72).
\textsuperscript{23} Anonymous. "It is devoutly . . ." (#9).
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.; see Wilson (#105).
nations." 25 In a word, a perfected Union will make us "respectable as a nation abroad, and rich as individuals at home." 26

Wealth and national security are good in themselves—they are the primary goods of Union—but they are also means to moral improvement. The aim of securing national prosperity, reluctantly accepted by the Anti-Federalists, was much more enthusiastically embraced by the Federalists, partly because of what they took to be its beneficial moral consequences. The love of wealth, properly regulated, fosters industry. "Industry is most favourable to the moral virtue of the world; it is therefore wisely ordered by the Author of Nature, that the blessings of this world should be acquired by our own application in some business useful to society. . . ." 27 Similarly with "national respectability," Federalist writers saw advantages going beyond mere national security. They often displayed a rather aggressive pride in the greater significance to be enjoyed by Americans under the new Constitution. Under it Americans can achieve "a distinguished rank among the nations of the earth." 28 Indeed, "a mighty empire may be formed upon this basis, which shall make its enemies tremble." 29 Anti-Federalists were not mistaken in seeing among the defenders of the Constitution a desire that Americans should play a vigorous part on the world stage. Some, at least, of the moral ascent the Federalists saw in the movement from citizen to federalist depended on looking beyond the petty business of the states to greater scenes of national significance, empire, and glory.

The Federalist writings abound with elements of this line of reasoning, from man to citizen to federalist; and it does help to reconcile their view of the historical and even legal primacy of the states on the one hand, and the ultimate primacy of the Union on the other hand. The reasoning is, however, mostly implicit—even Dickinson is cryptic. Perhaps what is involved is less a matter of reasoning than the expression of a strong moral sentiment. What is very clear, however, is the conclusion: "Hear then ye people of the United States! reason dictates, every feeling of the heart entreats, and Heaven commands, be federal and happy forever." 30

25. A Citizen of New Haven (#26), FE, p. 238; see A Landholder (#57), FE, pp. 146–47.
26. State Soldier (#81), February 6, 1788.
27. A Landholder (#57), FE, p. 200.
30. Anonymous, "It is devoutly . . ." (#9).
Government

If Union is the frame of the Federalist argument, energetic government is the heart. The Federalists' crucial task, as they saw it, was not to show the desirability of Union, or the ends of Union, or even the need for a Union-wide government. That was common ground. The real task was to make Americans understand what their commitment to Union and to freedom itself implies in the way of government. "If you would be free and happy a power must be created to protect your persons and property; otherwise you are slaves to all mankind."31 Government is "the foundation of all human happiness"; "there is no way more likely to lose one's liberty in the end than being too niggardly of it in the beginning."32 To acknowledge the need for a government is to acknowledge the need for power and compulsion. "A government capable of controlling the whole, and bringing its force to a point, is one of the prerequisites for national liberty."33 Such a government inevitably displays a somewhat harsh aspect. "Were we to view only the gaols and dungeons, the gallows and pillories, the chains and wheel-barrows, of any state, we might be induced to think government severe; but when we turn our attention to the murderers and parricides, and robberies and burglaries, the piracies and thefts, which merit these punishments, our idea of cruelty vanishes at once, and we admire the justice, and perhaps clemency, of that government which before shocked us as too severe."34

Of course power can be abused, but would anyone choose a lame horse, lest a sound one should run away with him? The tiresome Anti-Federal complaints about possible abuses of the powers under the Constitution and the absence of a bill of rights overlook that this government will be in the hands of representatives chosen by the people. Defense of the Constitution as providing a responsible government through the instrument of representation is a prominent, though as we shall see somewhat superficial, aspect of Federalist writing. James Wilson, for example, contended that the ancients had no proper idea of representation; and even in Great Britain the principle of representation was confined to a narrow corner. To America has been left "the glory and happiness of forming a government where representation shall at once supply the basis and the

32. State Soldier (#81), February 6, 1788.
33. A Landholder (#57), FE, p. 147.
34. P. Webster (#103), M/S, p. 103.
cement of the superstructure. For representation, Sir, is the true chain between the people and those to whom they entrust the administration of the government; and though it may consist of many links, its strength and brightness should never be impaired.” 35

This view pervades Wilson's thinking and that of many other Federalists. Echoing the Revolutionary slogan of "no taxation without representation," representation here is seen as the necessary and almost the sufficient condition of good government. In a properly arranged system, the representatives are the people. "The distinction between the powers of the people and of their Representatives in the Legislature, is as absurd in theory, as it proves pernicious in practice." 36

The question, then, is not the power of the legislature but "how are Congress formed? how far have you a control over them? Decide this, and then all the questions about their power may be dismissed for the amusement of those politicians whose business it is to catch flies. . . ." 37 The representatives under the proposed Constitution will be chosen by the people and will be bound to them by considerations of honor and gratitude as well as self-interest. Every member of Congress is liable to all the operations of the laws he himself passes and "this circumstance alone, is a sufficient security." 38 Roger Sherman sums up this traditional view: "The greatest security that a people can have for the enjoyment of their rights and liberties, is that no laws can be made to bind them nor any taxes imposed upon them, without their consent by representatives of their own chusing, who will participate with them in the public burthens and benefits; this was the great point contended for in our controversy with Great Britain, and this will be fully secured to us by the new constitution." 39

To the extent that they relied upon representation, these Federalist writers joined most of their Anti-Federalist opponents in defending what is basically a simple form of government, a government in which the representatives are elected by the people, responsible to the people, and presumed to be fundamentally identical to the people with regard to their interests and opinions. At this level the dispute is between the Federalists' heavy reliance on the mechanism of representation and the Anti-Federalists' insistence that genuine re-

35. Wilson, Speech of November 24, 1787 (#105), M/S, pp. 222–23; compare with Federalist 63.
36. America (#3).
38. America (#3).
responsibility can be found only in the smaller, more homogeneous states. So long as the issue is phrased in this way, the Anti-Federalists seem to have the better of it. But the deeper Federalist argument sees representation as something much more than a device for mirroring popular opinions and interests.

The notion of simple representative government has several clear difficulties, a consideration of which shows the weakness of the Federalists' argument at one level and its power at a deeper one. First is the issue of the fidelity of representatives. The Federalists rely heavily on two arguments, both of which are open to question. It is said that since under the new Constitution the representatives will be chosen by the people in open and free elections, they can also be displaced by the people if they should violate their trust. The Federalists do not in fact spend very much time considering the practical effectiveness of this electoral check, but their opponents point out with a great deal of plausibility that the actual capacity of the people to supervise and control their representatives through the electoral machinery, especially in the very large-scale American republic, will be very limited. Representatives will inevitably be chosen from among a relatively small group of widely known men, and their activities as rulers will be largely obscure to the mass of the electors. Moreover, the argument that the representatives are subject to the laws along with their constituents and therefore have identical interests is clearly an oversimplification. Even granting (what the Anti-Federalists did not grant) that there will not grow up a separate class of rulers, it is still clear that any group of representatives will have certain interests distinct from those of their constituents, another tendency certain to be magnified in the new, large federal government. To take the simplest case, the representatives will indeed have to share the cost of the government, but obviously they benefit from those expenditures in a way that the ordinary citizen does not. If a relationship of responsibility or identity of interests between representative and constituent is the central principle of the new government, as some of the Federalists did in fact contend, then it was not difficult for the Anti-Federalists to show the tenuousness of the connection.

This argument was met by other Federalists who, tacitly conceding that the chain of representation is not enough, showed that the Constitution provides additional and very effective safeguards, based solidly on interest, to secure the fidelity of representatives. These are the familiar checks and balances. "The perfection of political science consists chiefly in providing mutual checks amongst the several departments of power, preserving at the same time, the dependence
of the greatest on the people." 40 In fact a very considerable part of the Federalist writings was addressed to this issue. The structure and working of the proposed Constitution were explained in detail in order to show how well devised were the internal arrangements and how difficult and unlikely would be major breaches of trust by the representatives. 41

There is still a deeper problem with simple representative government seen as a mirror of society. Granting that such a government is responsive and safe, is it likely to be stable and competent? Many Federalists thought not and tried to show that the Constitution provides for "responsible" government in the broader (and now common) as well as in the narrower sense. Noah Webster elaborates well this line of reasoning. 42 He describes a chain of ideas about government followed by sober second thoughts, leading to the principle of a bicameral legislature (his immediate concern, writing as he was in Pennsylvania with its unicameral state legislature). Unanimous consent is the basis of all law, Webster begins; but experience shows that civil society is impossible unless the opinions of a majority are allowed to give law to the whole.

Similarly, at first sight it seems reasonable for all members of a society to meet together to decide on legislation; but it soon becomes evident that this is neither practical nor desirable, and a scheme of representation is substituted. Again, in the government thus established it seems very natural at first that all the representatives should be collected into one body; but on reflection the benefits of a more complex legislative arrangement are perceived. A second body can protect against sudden and violent passions and against being led astray by one extraordinary man; it can also instill qualities of wisdom and experience into governmental deliberations. The mutual checks of a complex government can provide, then, not only fidelity but also stability, prudence, and wisdom. Federalist descriptions of the Constitution to this effect abound. One further example will suffice here. The president, through the use of his veto and his veto messages, it was explained, will provide a useful channel of communication between those who make and those who execute the law. "Many things look fair in theory which in practice are impossible. If lawmakers, in every instance, before their final decree, had the opinion of those who are to execute them, it would prevent a

40. Hanson (#93), FP, p. 222 (italics omitted); see Anonymous, Speech to Have Been Delivered . . . (#14).
41. See Dickinson (#92), FP, p. 182; Hanson (#93), FP, p. 272.
42. N. Webster (#103), FP, pp. 30ff.
A thousand absurd ordinances, which are solemnly made, only to be repealed, and lessen the dignity of legislation in the eyes of mankind.\textsuperscript{43}

In arrangements like these lies the great strength of the new Constitution. Carefully framed in the light of experience in the states, it provides all of the qualities desirable in government: "fidelity, or firm attachments to the good of the people—wisdom to discern what is for the public good—and dispatch in business, or speedy execution of the measures determined upon."\textsuperscript{44}

The basis of these arrangements is of course a written constitution. The document framed in 1787 was the completion—and was seen, more or less clearly, by Federalists to be the completion—of the development of constitutional government in the United States since the Revolution. Constitutional government embraces and transcends the principle of representation. Establishing a constitution as supreme law is the act (the only act) of the sovereign people. The Constitution may be amended, a wise feature pointed out by many Federalists, but even amendment does not involve recourse to the original popular source but is an exercise of constitutional authority. Election, the essence of "representative" government as traditionally understood, becomes merely a method of choosing, not a method of authorizing. The legislature is a body of constitutional officers, not a microcosm of the sovereign people. The legislators, like other officers of government, derive their authority from the Constitution, not from their election. There is, thus, contrary to the view expressed by Noah Webster, a crucial distinction between the power of the people (as an original matter) and the power of their representatives.\textsuperscript{45} This is the basis of the whole system of checks and balances as well as of the doctrine, accepted by most Federalists, that acts of the legislature contrary to the Constitution are void. "When the powers to be exercised, under a certain system, are in themselves consistent with the people's liberties, are legally defined, guarded, and ascertained, and ample provision made for bringing to condign punishment all such as shall overstep the limitations of law,—it is hard to conceive of a greater security for the rights of the people."\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{43} A Landholder (#57), \textit{FE}, p. 158.
\textsuperscript{44} A Citizen (#25).
\textsuperscript{45} See the discussion of representation above.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Atticus} (#17), November 22, 1787. Most but not all of the Federalists seem to have assumed that the courts would regard such acts as void. See Hanson (#93), \textit{FP}, p. 234; Dickinson (#92), \textit{FP}, pp. 181–83; Iredell (#95), \textit{FP}, p. 357. See also James Wilson's extremely influential explanation of the limited powers delegated to the general government in contrast to the broad
Not all Federalists grasped the significance of constitutional government. As we have seen, there is still in many cases a heavy reliance on traditional notions of representation. There are occasional statements like that of Noah Webster, who disputed the claim for a bill of rights by contending that “the very attempt to establish a permanent, unalterable Constitution, is an act of consummate arrogance.” He argued that susceptibility of the representatives to their acts as legislators is alone “a sufficient security.” 47 Most Federalists saw the proposed Constitution, however, not merely as a set of agencies of popular consent, but also as the legal foundation for a government limited in its powers and in its interior arrangements. If all of these arrangements “can not keep the public decision within the bounds of wisdom, natural fitness, right and convenience, it will be hard to find any efforts of human wisdom that can do it.” 48

**Popular Government**

We must now look deeper into the Federalist understanding of popular government. While most Federalists saw that the Constitution was meant to provide a complex and not a simple representative government, they insisted on its fundamentally popular character. Whatever their other disagreements, most Federalists would have accepted this striking description by James Wilson:

> of what description is the constitution before us? In its principles, Sir, it is purely democratical; varying indeed, in its form, in order to admit all the advantages, and to exclude all the disadvantages which are incidental to the known and established constitutions of government. But when we take an extensive and accurate view of the streams of power that appear through this great and comprehensive plan, when we contemplate the variety of their directions, the force and dignity of their currents, when we behold them intersecting, embracing, and surrounding the vast possessions and interests of the continent, and when we see them distributing on all hands beauty, energy and riches, still, however numerous and wise their courses, however diversified and remote the blessings they diffuse, we shall be able to trace them to one great and noble source, THE PEOPLE. 49

powers enjoyed by the state governments in his early and widely distributed “State House” speech of October 6, 1787 (#68).

47. America (#3).

48. P. Webster (#103), M/S, p. 96.

49. Wilson, Speech of November 24, 1787 (#105), M/S, pp. 230–31; see Coxe (#90), FP, p. 147.
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

It is doubtless true that the emphasis placed by the Federalists on the popular character of the new Constitution was in part a response to Anti-Federalist criticism. Yet I think it is a distortion to picture them as an elite cleverly scrambling to retain control in a new democratic age. Their sincerity is manifest. Again and again they contend that this new government derives, as all legitimate government must, from the great source of political authority, the people. There must be, Wilson said, in every government one supreme sovereign power from which there is no appeal. "That the supreme power . . . should be vested in the people, is in my judgment the great panacea of human politics. It is a power paramount to every constitution, inalienable in its nature, and indefinite in its extent." 50 Madison himself, the great teacher of the danger of majority faction, had urged in Philadelphia that "the people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over." 51 Even Caesar, usually cited as strongly critical of the people, while doubting their majesty and political wisdom, never denied their right to accept or reject a proffered government. 52 Under the Constitution the power of the people is not only the ultimate authority but it pervades the whole system. This government will secure the freedom and promote the happiness of America, Dickinson said, "by giving the will of the people a decisive influence over the whole, and over all the parts." 53

The disagreement among the Federalists concerned not the truth but the sufficiency of the principle of popular sovereignty. In the days of struggle against the King, it had seemed to many that if only the people could grasp the government, the political problem would be solved; the means, as we have seen, is an adequate system of representation. But as popular rule is achieved, it becomes clear to everyone (what was always clear to some) that popular government is problematic because, among other reasons, "the people" is not homogeneous. Old problems of injustice, oppression, and tyranny emerge out of conflicts within "the people."

A traditional way of viewing this problem is that even a "democratic" society tends to divide into the natural elements of one/few/many, which are more or less in conflict with one another. This view was perhaps expressed most fully among the Americans by John Adams in his Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United

50. Wilson, Speech of November 24, 1787 (#105), M/S, p. 230.
52. Caesar (#20), FE, p. 288.
States. In the Constitutional Convention it found expression in statements by men like Gouverneur Morris and Alexander Hamilton. It is frequently expressed by the Anti-Federalists and helps to explain their admiration for the British government, despite their preference for the simple, small republic. Among Federalist writers this view is rather rare. They generally saw the Constitution as providing a new kind of complex government, an arrangement of constitutional powers rather than of social orders.

The different branches in the new government were not intended to “balance” one class against another, the way British branches are. “The sole intention of it is to produce wise and mature deliberation.” Our senate, Noah Webster explained, is not a different order of men; “but the same reasons, the same necessity for distinct branches of the legislature exists in all governments.” In the United States “we have all the advantages of checks and balance, without the danger which may arise from a superior and independent order of men.” This is a constant Federalist theme. The Constitution “unites in its different parts all the advantages, without any of the disadvantages, of the three well-known forms of government, and yet it preserves the attributes of a republic.” Thus the Anti-Federalist, Centinel, was several times attacked for his claim that the Constitution was designed to secure something like the mixed regime described by Adams; on the contrary, it was said, the new government is in every sense a popular government, one that secures the advantages without the disadvantages of the traditional mixed regimes.

There are, however, significant traces of this older view in some Federalist writing, which should be noted before we return to the main line of argument. Especially interesting are the essays of a Boston writer, Atticus, whose topic is party and republican governments. Atticus presents a version of the traditional view of government as representing and mediating between the basic elements of society. He begins by criticizing monarchy (it is not necessary for effective government) and parties (no violent party man can be a good citizen); but it turns out that parties are inevitable and useful and that their management does require a strong monarchical ele-

55. N. Webster (#102), FP, pp. 34–35; see the good discussion of the difference between the American “second house” and the British House of Lords by a Democratic Federalist (#33).
56. One of the Four Thousand (#62), M/S, p. 116.
57. See A Citizen (#24); P. Webster (#103), M/S, p. 95.
58. Atticus (#17).
ment. Two parties tend to emerge in all nondespotic governments. A democratic party, consisting of small property owners and debtors, tends towards levellism and democratic turbulence; an aristocratic party, consisting of large property owners, especially moneyed men, tends toward rigid aristocracy. Properly blended, *Atticus* argues in somewhat deceptively modern-sounding terms, parties give life to politics; they keep alive attention to public measures; they produce attendance and care in elections; and they keep any one interest from swallowing the rest. However, a third party is necessary to balance the democratic and aristocratic elements; and that must be found, after all, in the monarchical principle. This principle is represented in the American governments in the executive and judicial departments, supported by that class of the population dependent upon salaries, the natural supporters of monarchy. *Atticus* here is describing the American governments in general, and it is not always clear how he connects these principles to the new Constitution; but we have seen enough for our purpose.

Most of the Federalists, to repeat once more, did not see the Constitution as a mixing of social orders. The only American "order" is the people. That is decisive. Yet the "people" is not homogeneous and, according to the Anti-Federalists, will become less so if the relatively small republics of the states are submerged into a huge national aggregation. In the large commercial republic to be formed under the Constitution, the population will shatter into contending groups, with the inevitable emergence of a *de facto* aristocracy which will eventually control the government and the whole society. Thoughtful Federalists acknowledged the problem. The singularity of the order of "the people" in principle must rest on fact.

But what is wanted is not the petty, static homogeneity of the small, self-sufficient, and presumably public-spirited republic but what might be called the dynamic homogenizing tendency of the great commercial republic. The problem is not to prevent division or inequality but to prevent permanent division and inequality. The old defenders of popular government have looked to the wrong principle. "Virtue, patriotism, or love of country, never was and never will be, till men's natures are changed, a fixed, permanent, principle and support of government," Noah Webster insisted. Rather, "an equality of property, with a necessity of alienation, constantly operating to destroy combinations of powerful families, is the very soul of a republic—While this continues, the people will inevitably possess both power and freedom; when this is lost, power departs, liberty expires, and a commonwealth will inevitably assume some other form."59

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59. N. Webster (#102), *FP*, p. 59.
Differences in wealth can be great, so long as they cannot become permanent. Fortunately the circumstances of America foster such fluidity. Opportunities are great, commerce is vigorous. There is no need to squabble over a limited pie and little likelihood that a small class can permanently control the wealth and therefore the government of the country. Besides the abundant wealth of America, the system depends on an unqualified acceptance of a modern commercial society. The old vestiges of feudal tenure and the old idea of the landed interest as somehow unique and superior must be firmly abandoned. Eliminate primogeniture, destroy entailment, "leave real estates to revolve from hand to hand, as time and accident may direct; and no family influence can be acquired and established for a series of generations—no man can obtain dominion over a large territory—the laborious and saving, who are generally the best citizens, will possess each his share of property and power, and thus the balance of wealth and power will continue where it is, in the body of the people." 60 One Federalist went so far as to argue that the states should provide for equality in descent without will of females as well as males and in the most remote collateral branches. "By these means, poverty and extreme riches would be avoided, and a republican spirit would be given to our laws, not only without a violation of private rights but consistently with the principle of justice and sound policy." 61

The elimination of primogeniture and entail and the consequent tendency for large estates to be broken up was not a uniquely Federalist policy and is indeed most often associated with Jefferson and the small agrarian republic. The Federalists, however, were pressing in a different and on the whole more consistent direction. There was among Federalists little of that holding back from the modern commercial world that provides one strand of Jefferson's and the Anti-Federalists' thought. There were about as many "Farmers" and "Countrymen" among the Federalists as among the Anti-Federalists; and the defenders of the Constitution typically deny that there is any antagonism between the landed and the commercial interest, often contending that commerce is but the handmaiden of agriculture. At bottom, however, the Federalists affirm the fundamentally commercial character of agriculture itself. Thus Oliver Ellsworth, writing as A Landholder, described himself as a former merchant, now retired (thanks to industry and economy) to a farming life.

Throughout his essays, Ellsworth quietly but persistently presses

60. Ibid.
61. A Freeman (#43), January 30, 1788.
the claim of commerce, on which the prosperity of agriculture itself depends. "It may be assumed as a fixed truth that the prosperity and riches of the farmer must depend on the prosperity, and good national regulation of trade." He warns against the "artful men" who "tell you let trade take care of itself, and excite your jealousy against the merchant because his business leads him to wear a gayer coat, than your economy directs." 62 The United States will continue to be a country where the vast bulk of the people labor on the land; yet it will be a country in which the basic interest is commerce. The country will contain substantial differences of wealth, but old combinations will tend always to be broken up and new ones built.

Webster lays down two other conditions of free republican government, which are discussed at length by the Federalists but which can be passed over here, as well known and clear-cut views: the possession of information by the people and free and popular elections. "In a country like ours, abounding in free men all of one rank, where property is equally diffused, where estates are held in free simple, the press free, and the means of information common, tyranny cannot reasonably find admission under any form of government; but its admission is next to impossible under one where the people are the source of all power, and elect either mediatly by their representatives, or immediately by themselves the whole of their rulers." 63 These three conditions, then, are the essential bulwarks of republican freedom: a diffusion or fluidity of property, free press, and free and popular elections. 64

The main concern of the arguments examined thus far is still the traditional (in the American context) fear that an aristocracy will tend to control the government and the society to the disadvantage of the mass of the people. The Anti-Federalists remained unpersuaded that the people would remain their own masters in the vast commercial empire to be established under the Constitution. Many of the Federalists, on the other hand, doubted that this was the main problem

63. Ramsay (#101), FP, p. 379. Ellsworth wrote that the American governments are safe from monarchy or aristocracy "so long as the present descent of landed estates last and the mass of the people have, as at present, a tolerable education. . . ." A Landholder (#57), FE, p. 166; see America (#3).
64. A good deal of Federalist energy was devoted to showing that the press and elections would be free. This involved defending the Constitution against two major anti-Federalist criticisms: that there was no guarantee of freedom of the press and that the provision of Art. I, Sec. 4(1) permitting Congress to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections was a source of danger to free elections.
(though because of the reflexive character of Federalist writing, it is the one they spend most of their time dealing with). On the whole the Federalists inclined to the view that more was to be feared in American government from licentious democracy than from aristocratic oppression.\textsuperscript{65} This view had been expressed by Edmund Randolph when he initiated the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention; and it is a persistent Federalist theme, though perhaps not so prominent as the Federalists’ antidemocratic reputation might suggest.

"Many plausible things may be said in favor of pure democracy—many in favor of uniting the representatives of the people in one single house—but uniform experience proves both to be inconsistent with the peace of society, and the rights of freemen."\textsuperscript{66} Dickinson himself, for all of his emphasis on the will of the people, describes the two main problems of American government as the turbulence of the states and the licentiousness of the people.\textsuperscript{67} It is perhaps not accidental, however, that Dickinson, like most of the Federalist writers, discusses the problem of the turbulence of the states at considerable length, while only glancingly considering the problem of the licentiousness of the people or its solution.\textsuperscript{68}

One answer to popular excess is that the government itself should be strong and independent enough to resist foolish or unjust popular impulses. The American governments have been "too feeble and too popular," \textit{A State Soldier} said forthrightly. "The more independent a government is therefore of the people, under proper restraints, the more likely it is to produce . . . justice; and the more substantial and efficient under such restraints, the better calculated to protect both the persons and property of mankind."\textsuperscript{69} One of the characteristics of constitutional government is that it restrains the people as well as the government. If a constitutional government is strong it is, in principle and practice, independent of immediate popular impulses. This describes precisely the government under the new Constitution. We have come almost full circle back to the need for effective government. The Constitution provides a government with the vigor, competence, and independence that can resist popular licentiousness and secure individual liberty.

This is, however, not sufficient. The Federalists emphatically

\textsuperscript{65} Cato (#12); see Caesar (#20).
\textsuperscript{66} N. Webster (#102), \textit{FP}, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{67} Dickinson (#92), \textit{FP}, p. 200; see State Soldier (#81), February 6, 1788.
\textsuperscript{68} Dickinson (#92), \textit{FP}, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{69} State Soldier (#81), February 6, 1788, March 19, 1788.
concede that the government under the Constitution is and must be firmly (if not simply or directly) tied to and dependent on the popular will. The government under the Constitution, Dickinson explained, is balanced by the power from which it proceeds. 70 Publius would insist on a different formulation that would stress the absence of any direct agency by the people in the government. Nevertheless all Federalists must concede that in a popular government security from popular excess cannot finally be found in a strong, independent governmental force, or even in a supreme constitution. The soundness and health of the popular regime must depend finally on the health of its primary element.

Here the Anti-Federalists bring to bear their powerful argument that the civic virtue of the populace can be fostered only in a small republic. 71 The aggregate selfishness encouraged by the great commercial republic will destroy those qualities of moderation and public-spiritedness on which republican government depends. Many of the Federalists simply did not meet this objection. Wilson, for example, seems willing simply to trust in the vigor, good sense, and patriotism of the American people, without troubling himself very much about the extent to which the trust is justified. “[T]he citizens of the United States can never be wretched beyond retrieve, unless they are wanting to themselves.” 72 More thoughtful Federalists, James Madison among them, saw that the problem was the likelihood that the people very frequently would be “wanting to themselves.” 73

Madison rejects the traditional solution, that the people must be formed by the small republic into citizens. He opposes this with his now well known defense of the large republic: “Extend the sphere, and you take in greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.” There are bits and pieces of this view of the extended republic in other Federalist writings; but it is nowhere referred to specifically by other Federalist writers, so far as I can discover, and there is little evidence that it was

70. Dickinson (#92), FP, p. 183.
71. This is fully elaborated in Storing’s introduction to The Complete Anti-Federalist.
73. See Federalist 49.
influential or even widely understood. This is not the place to try to solve the still perplexing problem of the influence and the authority (which are not the same) of Madison's famous account of the large republic. It is perhaps not surprising that the great body of Federalists stayed closer to the surface and to traditional views.

On the whole the Federalist view of both the problem and the solution was more conventional than Madison's. "Popular licentiousness" was likely to be the way a typical Federalist described the problem. In this he would betray a less penetrating understanding than Madison, who saw that the fundamental problem of popular government is not popular uprisings or disturbances along the lines of Shays' "rebellion" but the unjust use that can be made by the majority of its lawful authority.

In seeking a solution, too, the typical Federalist was likely to look to the traditional principles of civic education and character-molding, precisely the principles that Madison found so unreliable, although there is more question here whether the usual view was quite so superficial as it might appear within the Madisonian perspective (or indeed whether Madison himself escaped the traditional reliance). The typical Federalist was likely, in a word, to preach. "Let the Americans be virtuous—let them be firm supporters of Republicanism—let them have confidence in their representatives—then their liberties will be secured to them, and peace and prosperity will ensue."

The point could be put rather more favorably by saying that many of the Federalists saw the continuing need for political leadership to form the manners and character of the people. Thus James Wilson, on the occasion of a Fourth of July speech in 1788, instructed the American people in the duties as well as the benefits of American citizenship. Frugality and temperance, industry, a warm and uniform attachment to liberty and the Constitution—these are the duties of citizenship. All the activities of government "spring from the original movement of the people at large." The people must provide "a sufficient force and a just direction" to all parts of the government. Especially, the people must choose good representatives, for on that all else depends. "It is the first connection in politics: if an error is made here, it can never be corrected in any subsequent

74. Federalist 10. See A State Soldier (#81), passim; Plain Truth (#74), M/S, p. 193; A Countryman (#31), FE, p. 215; Wilson, Speech of November 24, 1788 (#105), M/S, p. 220; Hanson (#93), FE, p. 247; Cato (#23); Cassius (#22), April 2, 1788; Dickinson (#92), FE, pp. 203–6; Anonymous, Speech to Have Been Delivered . . . (#14), July 25, 1788.

75. Maecenas (#58).
process.” Each citizen should vote as if his were the vote that would decide the election.76

Teaching, and even preaching, are important for the Federalists, more important than a reading of The Federalist would suggest.77 But that teaching of the duties of citizenship rests on the solid ground of the effective government provided by the Constitution. This is, again, the bedrock of the Federalist position. Civic morality is fostered where civic morality is effectively protected. Want of energetic government is followed by disobedience among the governed; that is followed in turn by general licentiousness, typically giving rise to a harsh antirepublican response that is likely to destroy liberty for the sake of order.78 “Nothing tends more to the honour, establishment, and peace of society, than public decisions, grounded on principles of right, natural fitness and prudence; but when the powers of government are too limited, such decisions can’t be made and enforced; so the mischief goes without a remedy. . . .” When the powers of government are in dispute, “the administration dare not make decisions on the footing of impartial justice and right” but must temporize, with the result that “the righteous go off injured and disgusted.” Controversy must have “a just, speedy, and effectual decision that right may be done before the contention has time to grow up into habits of malignity, resentment, ill nature, and ill offices.”79 A good government on an enlarged scale is a far better teacher of justice and patriotism than is the petty republic, with its inherent weakness and turbulence. The excellent government provided by the Constitution will enforce, habituate to, and teach civic virtue while going about its business of providing security, order, and justice between man and man.

“Virtue or good habits are the result of good laws—and from the excellent American Constitution those habits will be induced, that shall lead to those exertions, manufactures, and enterprises, which will give a scope to the American genius, and ‘find employment for their activity.’”780 Reject the Constitution, went a typical warning, and “you will possess popular liberty with a vengeance,” with the result that “no man’s property will be secure, but each one defrauding his neighbour under the sanction of law,—thus subverting every princi-

76. Wilson, Speech of July 4, 1788 (#89).
80. Convention (#30).
ple of morality and religion." Accept it, and "you will enjoy the blessing of a well balanced government, capable of inspiring credit and respectability abroad, and virtue, confidence, good order and harmony at home." 81

A Selected List of Federalist Writings

By Pseudonym

1. Alfredus (Samuel Tenny or Tenney), New Hampshire Freeman's Oracle, 18 January, 8 February, 13 June, 11 July, 23 August, 13 September 1788.
3. America (Noah Webster), New York Daily Advertiser, 31 December 1787.
4. An American Citizen (Tench Coxe), Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, 26 September, 28 September, 29 September, 24 October 1787 (also published as a pamphlet); in Ford Pamphlets.
5. Americanus, Virginia Independent Chronicle, 5 December, 19 December 1787.
9. Anon., "It is devoutly to be wished . . . ," Boston Gazette, 26 November 1787.

81. Cato (#23).
16. Aristides (Alexander Hanson), Baltimore, *Maryland Gazette*, 4 March, 1 April, 22 April 1788 (see #93).
34. A Dutchess County Farmer, Poughkeepsie *Country Journal*, 26 February 1788.
41. Foreigner, Boston American Herald, 26 November 1787.
42. A Freeholder, Virginia Independent Chronicle, 9 April (extraordinary), 23 April 1788.
43. A Freeman (Tench Coxe), Pennsylvania Gazette, 23 January, 30 January, 6 February 1788.
45. A Friend to the Constitution, Baltimore Maryland Journal, 16 October 1787.
46. A Friend to Good Government, Poughkeepsie Country Journal, 8 April, 15 April 1788.
47. A Friend to Honesty, Boston Independent Chronicle, 10 January 1788.
51. Harrington, Boston American Herald, 15 October 1787.
52. Hermenius, Carlisle Gazette, 16 January 1788.
53. Honestus (Benjamin Austin, Jr.), Massachusetts Centinel, 9 January 1788.
54. Honorius, Boston Independent Chronicle, 3 January 1788.
58. Maecenas, State Gazette of Georgia, 6 December 1787.
59. Monitor, Massachusetts Gazette, 30 October 1787.
62. One of the Four Thousand, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, 15 October 1787, in McMaster and Stone.
63. One of the Middle Interest, Massachusetts Centinel, 28 November 1787.
64. One of the People, Massachusetts Centinel, 17 October, 17 November 1787.
65. P. Valerius Agricola, Albany Gazette, 8 November, 6 December 1787.
66. A Patriotic Citizen, Carlisle Gazette, 21 May 1788.
68. A Pennsylvanian, Pennsylvania Gazette, 6 February, 13 February, 20 February, 27 February 1788.
69. A Pennsylvanian, Pennsylvania Gazette, 11 June 1788.
70. Philanthrop, Northampton, Massachusetts Hampshire Gazette, 23 April 1788.
73. Philo-Publius, New York Daily Advertiser, 1 December 1787.
74. Plain Truth, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, 10 November, 28 November 1787, in McMaster and Stone.
75. A Plebeian, Maryland Journal, 14 March 1788.
76. Poplicola, Massachusetts Centinel, 31 October 1787.
78. Remarker ad corrigendum, Boston Independent Chronicle, 3 January 1788.
79. A Republican, Boston Independent Chronicle, 28 February 1788.
80. Socius, Carlisle Gazette, 14 November 1787.
82. A Steady and Open Republican (Charles Pinckney), State Gazette of South Carolina, 5 May 1788, in Ford Essays.
83. Truth, Massachusetts Centinel, 24 November 1787.
84. Uncus, Baltimore Maryland Journal, 30 November 1787.
85. Union, Boston Gazette, 12 November 1787.
86. Valerius, Massachusetts Centinel, 28 November 1787.

By Author's Name, Where Known

90. Tench Coxe (American Citizen), An Examination of the Constitution of the United States, Philadelphia, 1788, in Ford Pamphlets (also published as newspaper essays).
91. William Davie (Publicola), Address to the Freeman of North Carolina, Newbern, 1788, in Ford Pamphlets.
92. John Dickinson (Fabius), Letters of Fabius, Wilmington, Delaware, 1787, in *Ford Pamphlets*.


95. James Iredell (Marcus), Answer to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution, Newbern, 1788, in *Ford Pamphlets*.

96. Jonathan Jackson (A Native of Boston), Thoughts Upon the Political Situation, Worcester, 1788.


98. Dr. James Montgomery (Decius), Decius's Letters on the Opposition, Richmond, 1789 (originally published in Virginia Independent Chronicle).


101. David Ramsay (Civis), An Address to the Freeman of South Carolina on the Federal Constitution, Charleston, 1788, in *Ford Pamphlets*.


